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Relief to Europe
Mervyn O’Driscoll
School of History, University College Cork
ABSTRACT
This paper explores aspects of Ireland’s post-war relief programme, both
governmental and non-governmental, including the provision of post-war relief
to Germany. Irish relief efforts to Europe during and after the Second World
War should inform the wider debates about the nature of Irish neutrality and
Ireland’s relationship with the post-war world, but they are overlooked in the
major analyses on Ireland and ‘the Emergency’. The provision of relief on the
basis of need led to the diagnosis that Germany deserved relief just as the other
war-torn countries did. This paper argues that many factors intertwined in the
instigation and sustenance of the relief programme to Europe. The Irish post-
war aid project was and remains unprecedented, in terms of the scale and the
level of national engagement, in the history of Irish humanitarianism. It is
paradoxical that it is not remembered.
INTRODUCTION
To the people of all the nations which have been directly involved in the war
our thoughts go out in sympathy on their deliverance from the daily terrors
in which they lived, and in sorrow that they must still endure the inevitable
suffering of the aftermath.
E´amon de Valera, 16 May 1945
Irish relief efforts to Europe during and after World War II are overlooked. This is
anomalous, as such efforts should inform the wider debates about the nature of
Irish Studies in International Affairs, Vol. 27 (2016), 117.
doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.3318/ISIA.2016.27.14
Author’s e-mail: mervod@ucc.ie
*This paper is based on a presentation to the conference of the International Affairs Standing
Committee of the Royal Irish Academy, titled ‘A society of free nations? Identity and values in
21st-century foreign policy’, which took place at the Royal Irish Academy in Dublin on 30 May
2016. The source of quote in the title of the paper is Da´il debates, vol. 97, no. 25, col. 2785 (19 July
1945).
Irish neutrality and Ireland’s relationship with the post-war world. Irish
charitable responses commenced in the latter half of the war. By 1943 the
government began to appreciate the catastrophe unfolding as Europe was
liberated from defiant Nazi domination. Nazi military resistance to the Allied
campaign in Italy, which began in September 1943, amplified an emerging and
colossal humanitarian need on mainland Europe. Rolling media reports under-
lined Nazi predations on many occupied populations, which, until late in the war,
had been systematically farmed for slave labour, or whose food supplies had been
reduced to the bare minimum to sustain the German war machine and boost
German living standards. In time the genocidal horrors of the concentration
camps began to emerge.
To what limited degree the Irish population appreciated the horrors of Nazism
before Allied victory in Europe deserves further investigation. This is not
immediately apparent, owing to the Irish censor’s almost obsessive efforts to
present an even-handed account of the war and sustain domestic popular support
for neutrality.1 Some elements of the population were instinctively pro-Axis for
reasons of their antipathy to Britain but many other quarters were pro-Allied, and
this was partially reflected in the substantial numbers of Irish volunteering to
fight in the British (and American) armed forces and working in the British war
industries. Regardless of the conflicting sympathies, however, people in Ireland
were largely united by their generous post-war humanitarian responses to the
indiscriminate devastation and slaughter wrought by total warfare. As the tide
turned decisively against Nazi Europe after 1943, the humanitarian need grew
exponentially. By early 1946 the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation
Administration’s (UNRRA) Emergency Economic Committee for Europe predic-
ted that in a few months 140 million Europeanswould have to subsist on a diet ‘below
the minimum normally necessary to ensure the ability to work and fight disease’.2
Ireland’s undiscriminating charity earned it approbation, but also criticism.
Some condemnation originated from those who questioned the equanimity of
Ireland’s pan-European relief when the decision was taken by the government to
include Germany in the official aid programme in late 1945. This was critiqued
as a sign of unedifying Irish sympathy for the German people, who were con-
sidered undeserving. Criticisms were also heard domestically, about the
desirability of sending relief to the continent at a time when many Irish people
suffered from acute deprivation, although such criticism failed to influence
government until 1947.3
All major works on Ireland and ‘the Emergency’, even those that have
discussed its post-war implications for Ireland, are silent on the subject of relief
to Europe.4 Cathy Molohan’s specialist work on IrishGerman relations in the
1See Donal O´ Drisceoil, Censorship in Ireland, 19391945: neutrality, politics and society
(Cork, 1996).
2‘A lesson for Ireland’, Editorial, Irish Independent, 7 February 1946.
3Letter to the editor from ‘Eire First’, Sunday Independent, 26 January 1947, 6; ‘Free food gifts
to Europe ‘‘Uncalled for’’’, Irish Independent, 5 February 1947, 2; ‘Let the people vote: should
food gifts be sent away?’, Sunday Independent, 16 Feruary 1947, 1.
4The general accounts overlook or barely mention the phenomenon of Irish humanitarian aid.
See: Robert Fisk, In time of war: Ireland, Ulster, and the price of neutrality, 193945 (London,
1985); Brian Girvin, The Emergency: neutral Ireland, 19391945 (London, 2006); Joseph T.
Carroll, Ireland in the war years (New York, 1975); T. Ryle Dwyer, Behind the green curtain:
Ireland’s phoney neutrality during World War II (Dublin, 2009); Clair Wills, That neutral island
(London, 2007); Bryce Evans, Ireland during the Second World War: farewell to Plato’s cave
(Manchester, 2014). The many specialist works on aspects of diplomacy, defence, strategy,
intelligence, society, the economy, politics and espionage are also remarkably quiet on the issue of
Ireland’s post-war relief programme.
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post-war decade has, however, illuminated Ireland’s aid to occupied Germany. It
explored Irish assistance to Germany but largely failed to appreciate it was part
of a continental-wide aid effort.5 Indeed, Irish generosity extended beyond
Europe. For instance, the Irish government endeavoured to alleviate the famine
in Bengal, India, following an appeal by the mayor of Calcutta in late 1943.6
That famine in Bengal was in fact caused by the war; following the fall of
Singapore in February 1942, the Japanese then invaded Burma, which was the
main source of rice imports for Bengal.
Traces of the Irish humanitarian project were recently revealed in investigat-
ions of Ireland’s engagement with the European Economic Community (EEC)
from the late 1950s onwards.7 These unearthed recurring evidence in the archives
of the original six member states of the EEC of positive European memories of
the aid received from Ireland. Recollections of Irish generosity remained
imprinted on the consciousness of several European statesmen who deliberated
on the fate of Ireland’s application to join the EEC during the 1960s.8 Not alone
had the states that went on to form the EEC been recipients of Irish charity but
so had almost every country from the Atlantic, perhaps not to Urals, but as least
as far as and including Greece, Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria and the Baltic
states.
This article will explore aspects of Irish post-war relief, both governmental
and non-governmental. It will also devote attention to Germany, because
Taoiseach Eamon de Valera’s immediate post-war policies towards that defeated
country remain matters of perennial comment. It is well-known that de Valera,
some other members of his government, and Joseph Walshe, the secretary of the
Department of External Affairs, were reluctant to repatriate German spies
captured and interned in Ireland into Allied custody in the immediate aftermath
of the war, fearing they would be interned and interrogated again by the Allies or
possibly deported to the Soviet zone. De Valera was especially averse to the
repatriation of ex-German diplomats, particularly the former minister Eduard
Hempel whom he considered, rightly or wrongly, as having behaved honourably
during the course of the war. The official Irish line was that the Allies had no
right to interrogate or punish former spies and ex-diplomats for alleged crimes
that had been committed against Ireland, a neutral country. Historians have
explored and discussed these topics predominantly through the lens of the
diplomatic ballet between Ireland, the US and the UK. That is indisputably
a major element in the Irish state’s posture at the end of the war and the early
post-war period, but it is not the only thread.9
To be sure, it is undeniable that de Valera’s overarching intention was to
ensure that the validity and propriety of Irish wartime neutrality was recognised
fully by the Allies. Allied propaganda critical of Irish neutrality was viewed as
5Cathy Molohan, Germany and Ireland 19451955 (Dublin, 1999).
6See National Archives of Ireland, Department of the Taoiseach (hereafter cited as NAI DT),
S13373 A, Note, 10 November 1943 and Telegram from de Valera to mayor of Calcutta, 11
November 1943.
7See Mervyn O’Driscoll, Dermot Keogh and Je´roˆme aan de Wiel (eds), Ireland through
European eyes: Western Europe, the EEC and Ireland, 19451973 (Cork, 2013), passim.
8See: Mervyn O’Driscoll, ‘Germany’, in O’Driscoll et al., Ireland through European eyes, 974:
246, 712; Christophe Gillissen, ‘France’, in O’Driscoll et al., Ireland through European eyes, 75
127: 823; Dermot Keogh, ‘Italy and the Holy See’, in O’Driscoll et al., Ireland through European
eyes, 12889: 145, 146; Je´roˆme aan de Wiel, ‘The Netherlands’, in O’Driscoll et al., Ireland
through European eyes, 190244: 190, 2069, 215, 216; Je´roˆme aan de Wiel, ‘Belgium’, in
O’Driscoll et al., Ireland through European eyes, 24590: 247, 2612.
9These subjects are investigated in many works such as Fisk, In time of war; John P. Duggan,
Neutral Ireland and the Third Reich (Dublin, 1989); Molohan, Germany and Ireland; Mark Hull,
Secret Ireland: German espionage in Ireland, 193945 (Dublin, 2003).
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particularly offensive by Irish democratic republicans; they interpreted it as
querying Ireland’s right to an independent foreign policy. Thus, neutrality
became an incontrovertible part of de Valera and Fianna Fa´il’s policy of
fortifying the sovereignty and independence of the Irish state. Many Irish
commentators and historians consider he stretched safeguarding neutrality and
Irish ‘honour’ too far, particularly in the case of offering his condolences to the
German minister on the death of Hitler, given the backdrop of the atrocities
and genocide committed by Nazi Germany.
In contrast to de Valera and Walshe’s insistent defence of the integrity of
Irish neutrality by negative means after the termination of the war, that is, a
reluctance to comply quickly and fully with Allied requests for the early
repatriation of former Axis personnel and former assets of the Axis, this article
contends that the Irish relief programme to Europe fitted into an emerging
construct of positive neutrality. This reinforced a national sense of good fortune
for having avoided the ravages of war and retrospectively justified neutrality on
moral grounds. At a popular level, this positive assertion of neutrality was
reinforced and sustained by a strong sense of thanksgiving for national salvation
from the ravages of total and industrialised war. The evidence of popular
donations to relief funds and NGO activity substantiates this. From a national
elite perspective (particularly on the part of the governing party of Fianna Fa´il
and the Department of External Affairs), the humanitarian programme also
served other purposes: it counteracted Allied and liberated people’s criticisms
that Irish neutrality had been self-regarding and self-interested. It also
differentiated Ireland from Britain as part of Ireland’s national and indepen-
dence project.
But in addition it legitimised neutrality as a progressive human and political
value in many Irish citizens’ minds. Allied indifference to, and compounding of,
German human suffering in the aftermath of victory was viewed by de Valera as
counterproductive and unwise. In adopting this position de Valera interpreted
World War Two as the outcome of vindictive peacemaking against Germany
after the Great War. This was consistent with his interwar posture.10 Irish
impartiality in the distribution of relief in 1945 and 1946 was viewed as
neutralist. Relief on the basis of need led to the diagnosis that Germany deserved
relief just as the other war-torn countries of Europe did.
ORIGINS OF IRISH ASSISTANCE
Irish government and Irish Red Cross interest in providing for relief to
war-affected regions of Europe commenced as early as December 1942 and
January 1943 with an offer to send a food consignment to Belgium or Greece.11
In November 1943, Da´il E´ireann voted £200,000 in financial aid to the Red
Cross to alleviate distress caused by war and famine in Europe and India.12 In
Europe, the pope’s appeal for the relief of starvation in Italy, as the Anglo-
American forces advanced through the peninsula during the autumn of 1943,
provided a strong confessional impetus.13 At least seven humanitarian proposals
were put forward to provide Irish assistance to Europe from 1943 until the spring
10See Mervyn O’Driscoll, Ireland, Germany and the Nazis: politics and diplomacy, 19191939
(Dublin, 2004).
11NAI DT, S13373A, Walshe to de Valera, 25 April 1945; NAI, Department of Foreign Affairs
(hereafter DFA), 419/4 Part I, Memo for taoiseach, 24 April 1945.
12Da´il debates, vol. 91, no. 6, col. 19872014 (11 November 1943).
13Da´il debates, vol. 91, no. 6, col. 19872014 (11 November 1943); Da´il debates, vol. 94, no. 6,
col. 1926 (26 September 1944); Da´il debates, vol. 95, no. 10, cols. 133243 (1 December 1944).
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of 1945.14 Until the end of hostilities in Europe, however, the Irish relief effort
faced almost insuperable logistical and transportation obstacles.15 It was
impossible to acquire navicerts from British authorities to ship the foodstuffs
and livestock to the war-torn regions; the prosecution of the war took centre
stage from the British perspective and Ireland remained dependent on the British
merchant navy, in spite of the efforts of the Ministry of Supplies, led by Sea´n
Lemass, and the recently established Irish Shipping Limited.16
In March 1945, the government established a high-level interdepartmental
committee, afterwards termed the European Relief Committee, to deliberate on
the commodities Ireland could offer for the relief of Europe.17 This top-level
official committee comprised of secretaries and deputy secretaries of the
departments of Finance, External Affairs, Industry and Commerce, Supplies
and Agriculture and it met for the first time on 27 March.18 James McElligott,
the secretary of the Department of Finance, chaired the committee, which
undertook a review of the ‘urgently needed’ commodities the country could
release. At the first meeting both Anthony Leydon (secretary of the Department
of Supplies) and Joseph Walshe pointed to the emerging food shortages and
referred
to the danger that unless this country showed and publicised its readiness
to provide assistance there would be considerable loss of good will and
colour would be given to the propagandist charges levelled against us in
section of the British and American press that we were concerned only about
ourselves and were enjoying higher standards of living than in any other part
of Europe.19
McElligott disputed there was any evidence of such a propaganda campaign.
Generally the committee agreed Ireland had to contribute to provide humani-
tarian assistance to mitigate continental suffering. Ireland could quickly
provide beef and live cattle. It might also provide butter and eggs by reducing
the domestic rations.20 It was felt by Walshe that there would be ‘very little
objection’ to giving gifts in kind to devastated areas, and the assistant secretary
of the Department of External Affairs, Frederick Boland, emphasised ‘the
necessity for making it clear in any public announcement, that the giving of
relief on the scale proposed represented a real sacrifice to the people of this
country’.21 The committee concluded at its third meeting on 25 April 1945 that
food and goods to the value of £3 million could be made available for European
relief.22
14NAI DFA, 419/4 Part I, Memo for taoiseach, 24 April 1945.
15NAI DT, S13373A, de Valera to Kingsmill-Moore, 24 April 1945; NAI DFA 419/4 Part I,
Memo for taoiseach, 24 April 1945.
16See Frank Forde, The long watch: the history of the Irish Mercantile Marine in World War
Two (Dublin, 1981); H.C. Spong, Irish Shipping Ltd. 19411982 (Kendal, 1982); B. Cleare, B.
Boyce, L. Coy and J. Boyce, Irish Shipping Ltd.: a fleet history (Rosslare, 2013); Fisk, In time of
war, 315.
17Walshe christened it the European Relief Committee in his report of its meeting on 30 July
1945. See NAI DFA, 414/4 Part I, Note by J.P. Walshe, 30 July 1945.
18NAI DFA, 419/4 Part I, Department of Finance ‘Note’, 28 March 1945.
19NAI DFA, 419/4 Part I, Department of Finance ‘Note’, 28 March 1945.
20NAI DFA, 419/4 Part I, Department of Finance ‘Note’, 28 March 1945.
21NAI DFA, 419/4 Part I, Department of Finance memorandum (Account of committee
proceedings on 25 April 1945), n.d.
22NAI DFA, 419/4 Part I, Department of Finance memorandum for the government, ‘Relief in
Europe’, 26 April 1945; and Department of Finance memorandum (Account of committee
proceedings on 25 April 1945), n.d.
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In May 1945, adhering to the recommendations of the interdepartmental
committee, the Irish government budgeted for expenditure of £3 million for
post-war relief of liberated western European countries.23 Minister for Finance
Sea´n T. O’Kelly, in announcing the provision in the budget speech of 2 May
1945, highlighted that the Irish relief should not be comprised of surplus Irish
food and goods simply, but would provide food, money and other essentials,
‘even at the sacrifice of our own consumption’.24 The official public discourse
surrounding the announcement of the programme was one of ‘self-denial’. Sea´n
MacEntee (the minister for Local Government) even advocated government
borrowing to maximise the Irish relief effort.25 De Valera noted in the Da´il on
18 May that Sweden and Switzerland were playing a large role in assisting
distressed neighbouring countries.26 The drawing of this neutral parallel
signified that de Valera desired Ireland to act in a similarly positive fashion.
Unremitting news coverage, of famine and disease in Europe, emanating
from international news agencies fuelled a sense of urgency. The devastation
and dislocation caused by the war coincided with a drought among major food
producers especially in the Southern hemisphere (Argentina, Australia) in the
mid-1940s. Global food production was falling. The US was also affected by the
unfavourable weather conditions and had to reduce its lendlease food supplies
to the UK in early 1945 and divert some of its supplies to liberated Europe.27 In
May it was reported that 10,000 had died of starvation in Amsterdam.28
Proposals to plant the Phoenix Park and the Curragh with potatoes to meet
European needs were made in the Da´il, only to be rejected by the minister for
Agriculture*it was too late in the season to plant with any reasonable chance
of success.29
The neglect of the country’s continental relief efforts is curious, given that de
Valera announced the relief package in 1945 as part of his much-cited critique of
Churchill’s post-war victory speech. In his address on 13 May, the British prime
minister congratulated Britain for not having laid ‘a violent hand’ on neutral
Ireland despite British ‘necessity’ during the war. In his response on 16 May, de
Valera’s accusation that Churchill was ungracious played successfully to
nationalist opinion (‘Could he not find it in his heart the generosity to
acknowledge that there was a small nation that stood alone, not for one year
or two, but for several hundred years against aggression’).30 It was high drama
over the air waves as the two leaders engaged in a duel of words and rhetoric.
They simply could not resist needling one another even as they both claimed
their own form of victory in the latest European conflict. But as is often the case,
political rhetoric and contention between nations obscures much.
23Da´il debates, vol. 97, col. 7256 (18 May 1945); NAI DT, S13373A, Walshe to de Valera, 25
April 1945; NAI DT, S13373A, Department of Finance memorandum for government, ‘Relief in
Europe’, 26 April 1945.
24Da´il debates, vol. 97, no. 1, cols. 445 (2 May 1945).
25NAI DT, S133373A, MacEntee to de Valera, 18 April 1945.
26Dail Debates, vol. 97, no. 7, col. 726 (18 May 1945). The Department of External Affairs
closely monitored the measures taken for relief of war victims in other neutral countries from the
end of the war. See NAI DFA 419/24. Arguably the example of other neutrals, in particular
Sweden and Switzerland, served as a precedent for and reinforcement of Irish humanitarian
measures.
27‘Spectator’s Leader Page parade’, Irish Independent, 25 April 1945, 2.
28‘10,000 died of starvation’ and ‘Dutch hotel menus, black market prices’, Irish Press, 12 May
1945.
29Da´il debates, vol. 97, no. 3, col. 748 (23 May 1945).
30Maurice Moynihan, Speeches and statements by Eamon de Valera 191773 (Dublin, 1980),
Document 91, 476.
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In his radio broadcast to the nation of 16 May, de Valera principally rejoiced
at the deliverance of the Irish nation from the ravages of the war. He requested
a growth in Irish food production to feed the European peoples less fortunate
than the Irish:
We have been spared what so many nations have had to undergo, and there
lies upon us, accordingly, a duty, within our limited power, to assist in
succouring those who have been less fortunate than we have been.31
De Valera anticipated food shortages and famine would continue in Europe
‘over the next few years’. He encouraged Ireland to play its part in meeting the
global food deficit, if necessary by making sacrifices, including the extension of
food rationing so that supplies could be diverted to Europe.32 De Valera’s
humanitarian arguments struck home as news of the desolation that prevailed
throughout Europe saturated press reports.
Pope Pius XII’s acknowledgement of Ireland’s generosity in June 1945 added a
renewed impetus to Irish efforts. He argued that Ireland had emerged unscathed
from the desolation; it had a special task in alleviating Europe’s distress.33 In late
August, the pope, as part of a general appeal for world cooperation, requested
‘the victorious nations not to abuse their victory’.34 This served to highlight the
need for former neutrals to demonstrate equability and compassion. The head of
the Catholic church’s intervention resonated in Ireland, given the population’s
predominant religious faith. Even the Irish Times, which was traditionally
perceived to be associated with Anglo-Irish interests and pro-Allied in sympa-
thies, estimated that the remarks of the head of the Catholic church were partially
calculated to stay the hand of American and British vengeance. The paper noted
that it would be unjust to hold the Germans as individuals or as a people
responsible for the crimes of ‘Hitler and his gang’, observing that Pius XII clearly
preferred the Anglo-Saxon system, despite its imperfections, to the Soviet one.
The editorial pointed out that the Anglo-American publics still suffered
from an understandable, but nonetheless ill-advised, ‘war psychosis’ and it would
take time for this to abate.35 The newspaper adopted a position of equanimity that
seemed to characterise much of Irish public opinion. Though there were domestic
critics from the outset in mid-1945, de Valera was firm and was supported by a
general cross-party consensus that the aid package was required. De Valera
advised the Da´il, when it voted for the £3 million in aid on 19 July 1945, that when
confronting such criticism from constituents:
You will always find some people who will not do that [accept the
government’s explanation for the relief], but at least you can say to them
they have been saved; that Providence has saved them from the effects of a
disastrous war; that as human beings they have responsibilities to other
human beings and, whilst other nations have had to undergo all the horrors of
war, we have been saved here. You can ask them whether they are not willing
voluntarily to make these sacrifices for the sake of fellow human beings who
are suffering.36
31Moynihan, Speeches and statements by Eamon de Valera 191773, 471.
32Moynihan, Speeches and statements by Eamon de Valera 191773.
33‘Pope’s views on Ireland’, Irish Times, 23 June 1945, 1.
34‘Pope calls for world co-operation’, Irish Times, 31 August 1945, 1.
35‘Pope’s plea’, Irish Times, 31 August 1945, 3.
36Da´il Debates, vol. 97, no. 25, col. 2785, (19 July 1945).
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He stressed the US and Britain were taking the main burden of sending food to
Europe, and Sweden and Switzerland were also playing a ‘splendid part’.
Ireland had to play its role.37
The Vote on the relief package did not cover the cost of surplus stock (valued
at £86,000), such as blankets and cooking apparatus, supplied by the
Department of Defence, that was also provided for European relief.38 The
French, Italian, Belgian and Dutch governments accepted the offer by late July
1945.39 One-fifth of the supplies was allocated to the Joint Relief Commission
of the International Red Cross based in Switzerland, which distributed aid to
the following: Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Northern
Italy, Poland, Romania and Yugoslavia.40 The Irish state and voluntary
collections provided food, clothes, medicine, essential equipment, vaccines and
temporary shelter to distribution centres in association with the International
Red Cross and national relief agencies throughout Europe. In France, for
instance, the Irish contribution even included the establishment of a temporary
hospital and the provision of appropriate Irish medical personnel.41 In the
summer of 1945 Irish government relief was allocated in equal parts to the
Netherlands, France, Belgium, Italy and the International Red Cross. Bilateral
government-to-government aid-in-kind deals were worked out with the four
west European governments.
Many Europeans derived benefits from both the Irish official relief
programme to post-war western, central and eastern Europe, and from the
Irish public’s donations to charitable organisations. The government made a
further sum of £3 million available for shipments of relief supplies to Europe in
June 1946. The bulk of this 194647 Irish government gift was shipped to central
and eastern Europe, in contrast to the 194546 gift, which was largely focused on
western Europe.42 This generated a positive image of Ireland in the post-war
period, regardless of whether or not the recipients considered Irish neutrality
during the late war had been the correct policy. It was a major piece of public
diplomacy conducted at a continental scale. In 1946 and 1947 the Irish public’s
charitable donations overtook the government monies set aside for the relief of
Europe. Many voluntary organisations collected donations of non-perishable
food, in addition to clothing and other life-sustaining provisions, from an
unstinting public. By late 1946 Ireland was exporting its estimated food surplus
as part of the government’s relief scheme to Europe.43
Despite the exhaustion of the land, for want of sufficient imported fertilisers
and quality arable land, and mounting hostility from the opposition political
parties and farmers, the government sustained its emergency policy of compelling
Irish farmers to keep up and increase tillage production.44 The government
argued there was a continued need for increased domestic wheat and other cereal
production to relieve Irish demands on global stocks and to contribute to
37Da´il Debates, vol. 97, no. 25, col. 2785 (19 July 1945).
38Da´il Debates, vol. 97, no. 25, col. 2785 (19 July 1945).
39‘Survey page’, Times Pictorial, 28 July 1945, 2; Da´il debates, vol. 97, cols. 27856 (19 July
1945).
40NAI DFA, 419/1/7, Memorandum, ‘The alleviation of distress in Germany and Austria’,
c. April 1951.
41See Phyllis Gaffney, Healing amid the ruins: the Irish Hospital at Saint-Loˆ (194546)
(Dublin, 1999).
42NAI DFA, 419 AA, Notes by Boland for de Valera, 7 March 1947.
43NAI DFA, 419/4/20, Molloy to Bourke, 18 September 1946.
44Da´il debates, vol. 98, no. 2, col. 155 (11 October 1945); Da´il debates, vol. 130, no. 12, col.
174950 (28 Nov. 1946).
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relieving European hardship until global cereal production recovered. Besides, it
could be anticipated that an increase in Irish demand for American and Canadian
wheat would not be entertained by US decisonmakers, in view of the European
continent’s subsistence crisis. As a former neutral, Ireland was a lower priority
than Allied nations and liberated countries.
Voluntary gifts to Europe, and particularly to Germany, grew in 1946 and
1947 when Irish food production fell. First, during the harvest of 1946 many
parts of the country were afflicted by heavy and unseasonal flooding. This led
to the unprecedented action of de Valera going on the national air waves on 8
September 1946 to rally ‘a united national effort to save the harvest’ as a
‘considerable portion of the grain crop’ was by then lost. Volunteers were
required in a last-ditch effort to save some of the crop in breaks in the inclement
weather. Even civil servants were released from work to assist.45 Then in the
spring of 1947 the country was affected, like the remainder of Europe, by an
acute and harsh late winter, that some have called an Arctic Siege. In Ireland
it was known as the ‘Big Snow of 1947’. From late January until March that
year, Ireland received its most extreme and relentless snow and ice offensive
since meteorological records began.46 The government considered it necessary
for the Agricultural Credit Corporation to introduce a scheme to make loans
without interest available to farmers to restock following the ‘serious and
abnormal losses of cattle and sheep as a result of severe weather in the early
months of 1947’.47
GERMAN CRISIS
The appalling and deteriorating conditions affecting the German people became
apparent during the late summer and autumn of 1945. The Nazi economy had
collapsed. Food, clothing, shelter and coal shortages generated inflation and
hardship as winter approached. The division of Germany into four zones
administered by the US, Soviet Union, France and the UK disrupted the internal
food supply system between east and west and immeasurably complicated food
distribution.48 As one of the largest food importing countries in the world,
Germany traditionally depended on imports from its neighbours, especially in
eastern Europe, but in the final stages of the war these supplies halted. What is
more, Germany’s population was artificially swollen with millions of forced
labourers especially from eastern Europe; these had been uprooted by the Nazis
to work in the German war economy. Many were reluctant to return to their
homelands, which were now Soviet-occupied territories.
Intensifying the situation, millions of refugees from the east crowded into
the already heavily populated and seriously bomb-damaged urban-industrial
western zones (administered by Britain, France and the United States). Many
cities had been carpet bombed leaving massive shortages in residential housing
even for the pre-war German population.49 The refugees were fleeing the advance
of the Red Army or were forcibly expelled from various parts of eastern Europe in
45NAI DT, S 13907.
46Kevin C. Kearns, Ireland’s Arctic siege: the Big Freeze of 1947 (Dublin, c. 2011).
47NAI DT, S 14605, Advertisement, ‘Special temporary scheme of loans for purchase of cattle
and sheep’, 21 April 1947.
48Graham Hallett, ‘West Germany’, in Andrew Graham and Anthony Seldon (eds),
Government and economies in the postwar world: economic policies and comparative performance,
194585 (London, 1991); NAI DFA, 419/1/7, Report on visit to Germany, Austria and Hungary
by Brian Brady, 7 January 1947, 8.
49NAI DFA, 419/1/7, Report on visit to Germany, Austria and Hungary by Brian Brady, 7
January 1947.
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retribution by local partisans and new governments aiming to establish national
states. The moving of the Polish border further west to the Oder-Neisse line also
displaced millions. Then there were the Sudetenland Germans of Czechoslovakia,
many of whom were unceremoniously dispatched in similarly horrific conditions.
These Sudetens were the largest constituents of the Volksdeutsche that either fled
west or were forced out in a brutal manner. The Volksdeutshce were the ethnic
Germans who lived in eastern European lands for many generations. There were
also Germans whom the Nazis had settled in the east during the war, as part of
their Lebensraum (living space) programme. Most arrived to a devastated
Germany half-starved, traumatised and in need of medical attention. Indeed
any unwanted minorities were pushed from eastern Europe into Germany, and
particularly into the western zones. Minorities, the destitute, the elderly, the
unwanted and the hated were all expelled. Tragically, most of the few remaining
Jews left in eastern Europe after the Nazi holocaust were also pushed west. The
Western allies were complicit in this. As a UK Foreign Office draft memorandum
warned in March 1946: ‘we tend to regard occupied Germany as a waste-paper
basket with a limitedless capacity for the unwanted waste of the world’.50 The
deportations were part of the Potsdam final agreement and a subsequent Allied
Control Council (Germany’s temporary four-power government) agreement
(named ‘Operation Swallow’). Although Potsdam stipulated that any transfers
taking place should be ‘orderly and humane’, they were anything but and led to
the immediate deaths of at least 500,000 in a sort of cathartic brutality exercised
by local populations following their oppression under the Nazis. British opinion
became scandalised in 1946 when these atrocities first began to be reported, but
American and French opinion were less concerned.
In the last decade or so, these events gained greater recognition. There is still
an unwarranted fear that to acknowledge the inhumanity involved in the
massive population transfer of 1214 million people to Germany is, somehow,
to excuse the crimes of Nazism or diminish them. War damage in Germany
was aggravated by poor Allied post-war planning and administrative infighting.
The early post-war Allied deindustrialisation and pastoralisation policies
(the punitive Morgenthau Plan), combined with the requirement to make war
reparations (to the Soviet Union primarily), exacted a heavy cost on the swollen
population of Germany.51
Unsurprisingly, the citizens of defeated Germany were a low priority in the
estimation of the victors. The United Nations’ Relief and Rehabilitation
Administration (UNRRA) statutes initially forbade it from alleviating German
distress in the immediate aftermath of the war. Its targets were the liberated
peoples. UNRRA was largely controlled by the US, its largest donor. It operated
from 1943 to 1947 to relieve and administrate liberated countries. Among the
Allies, the UK had to continue domestic food rationing after the war, and
precarious food situations prevailed in France and the Soviet Union. Simulta-
neously, a forthright absence of international sympathy for Germany prevailed.52
One UK Foreign Office specialist (Robin Hankey) wrote in the summer of 1947:
50Cited in R.M. Douglas, Orderly and humane: the expulsion of the Germans after the Second
World War (London, 2012), 192.
51Volker R. Berghahn, ‘West German reconstruction and American industrial culture, 1945
1960’, in Reiner Pommerin (ed.), The American impact on postwar Germany (Providence, RI,
1995), 6581: 7071; Konrad H. Jarausch, After Hitler: recivilizing Germans, 19451995 (Oxford,
2006; translated by Brandon Hunziker).
52See Giles MacDonough, After the Reich: the brutal history of the Allied occupation
(New York, 2007).
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‘I cannot work up much sympathy for the poor Germans, much as I condemn
the way they were treated.’53
The tenor of early US policy towards Germany was stated in directive
JCS 1067 issued by the military governor of the US Occupied Zone, General
Dwight D. Eisenhower, in October 1945. This directive decreed: ‘Germany will
not be occupied for the purpose of liberation but as a defeated enemy nation’.54
Vengeance and a feeling of ‘just desserts’ dominated Allied attitudes towards
Germany. Policies of reparations, occupation and immiseration aggravated
subsistence and housing crises. Parts of occupied Germany teetered on the brink
of a full-blown humanitarian disaster.55 The rights of the defeated were not a
primary concern. ‘Germany as the enemy still loomed over international relations
for a while, then, after 1946, the Soviet Union slowly began to fill this role.’56
FAVOURITISM?
From the late summer of 1945 the Irish dailies saturated readers with coverage
of the emerging German crisis from international news agencies, Christian
organisations and humanitarians. In October, the Journal of the Medical
Association of Ireland requested immediate aid for Germany. It professed, ‘our
motto should be to send relief supplies to where they are most needed,
irrespective of political consideration’, adding that ‘the sending of food to
Germany especially may be fraught with many difficulties’ but charity demanded
it.57 It continued: ‘Let us do all we can to prevent this from being the worst
European winter since the Thirty Years War’.58 In the autumn, Allied occupation
authorities dimly realised the scale of the potential food crisis in Germany, which
had received less favourable assistance than liberated countries. General
Eisenhower was now reported as expressing the view that Germany’s most
serious problem was a food deficit.59
The Americans gradually shifted ‘from a policy of punishment to one of
restoration of Germany’ from late 1946, because of the looming threat that the
Soviet Union was constructing an alternative political and economic system in
the east.60 At this point the extent of German general deprivation was incon-
trovertible, as swathes of the population teetered on the edge of starvation.
Then the poor judgement animating the earlier ‘tougher’ and badly designed
policies towards Germany was exposed. The initial sign of a softening US policy
occurred when Harry Truman first authorised US humanitarian relief to
Germany in February 1946, but a time-lag ensued before US aid organisations
53Douglas, Orderly and humane, 346.
54U.S. Department of State, Germany, 19471949: the story in documents (Washington DC,
1950), 23.
55To a great extent, Allied policies ‘seemed to emphasize destruction rather than reconstruc-
tion’ in the case of Germany until at least 1947: see Christoph Buchheim, ‘From enlightened
hegemony to partnership: the United States and West Germany in the world economy, 1945
1968’, translated by Richard Sharp, in Detlef Junker, The United States and Germany in the era of
the Cold War, 19451990 (Cambridge, 2004), vol. 1, 19451968, 25570: 2589.
56Manfred Overesch, ‘Senior West German politicians and their perception of the German
situation in Europe 19451949’, in J. Becker and F. Knipping (eds), Power in Europe? Great
Britain, France, Italy and Germany in a postwar world, 19451950 (Berlin and New York, 1986),
11734: 1189.
57‘Medical journal urges Irish aid for Germans’, Irish Times, 3 October 1945, 4.
58‘Medical journal urges Irish aid for Germans’, Irish Times, 3 October 1945, 4.
59‘Eisenhower reports food problem serious in Germany’, Irish Times, 1 October 1945, 1.
60William I. Hitchcok, The struggle for Europe: the history of the continent since 1945 (London,
2003), 31.
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could assemble and ship the relief. The first American aid packages arrived in
August 1946*fourteen months after Germany’s unconditional surrender. US aid
only poured into Germany in large quantities in 1947 following Washington’s
tardy recognition of the scale of the problem and of the prospective political
repercussions of its dilatory efforts.61 Until then it was left to neutrals such as
Ireland and other independent-minded and humanitarian-motivated parties to
alleviate the widespread distress and subsistence crisis in Germany. Hopelessness
prevailed.
Brian Brady, a Fianna Fa´il TD, undertook an extensive fact-finding visit on
behalf of the Irish Red Cross Society to Germany, Austria and Hungary from
2 November to 21 December 1946. He confirmed the parlous food, housing, fuel
and refugee conditions prevailing in Germany and Austria in an expansive
report to the both the Red Cross and the Department of the Taoiseach.62 He
gained an exceptional insight into conditions in Germany. In addition to visiting
the three western occupation zones, he was the first representative of an outside
relief organisation to be granted permission to visit the Soviet zone.63 Brady
recommended that the continuation of Irish relief to Germany was paramount,
as the need for it was ‘greater than ever before’ and the ‘inadequate rations’ had
undermined the health of the population to such a degree that ‘resistance to
disease is very low’. The majority of victims of disease were children and young
people: ‘The picture of destitution in German cities and towns could not be
exaggerated and one shudders to think of the conditions under which these
people, particularly the children, are existing this winter.’64 He indicated that
‘people seem quite apathetic and have no hope in the future’, and that thus far
there was no ‘appreciable effort’ to ‘cope with the widespread destruction’ of the
country, with the urban ruins of Germany ‘practically untouched’. Rebuilding
could not commence and consequently the accommodation crisis would not be
solved until the population had food and clothing. An acute challenge was the
shortage of manpower. It was estimated six million German men had been killed
in the war and another six million were POWs, internees or invalided. These were
all within the productive age cohorts.65
The cold and harsh winters of 194647 and 194748 heightened the
subsistence struggles of millions in Europe and Germany. In the pre-war
period the western zones of Germany had depended on extensive imports of
food funded by industrial exports, but this was no longer possible. A decline in
German coal production added to the misery in the near Arctic winter
conditions in some of the immediate post-war years, but especially in the winter
of 194748. In this context, Irish post-war humanitarian assistance and its
equability allocating that assistance is significant.
Irish government supplies were distributed in all four occupation zones of
Germany, including Berlin and the Soviet zone, following the negotiation
of a special agreement between the Soviet commander and a delegate of the
61Godehard Weyerer, ‘CARE packages: gifts from overseas to a defeated and debilitated
nation’, translated by Eric Weinberger, in Detlef Junker (ed.), The United States and Germany in
the era of the Cold War, 19451990, vol. 1, 19451968 (Cambridge, 2004), 5227; ‘US plan to
rush’, Irish Times 16 May 1947.
62NAI DFA, 419/1/7, Report on visit to Germany, Austria and Hungary by Brian Brady, 7
January 1947.
63NAI DFA, 419/1/7, Report on visit to Germany, Austria and Hungary by Brian Brady, 7.
64NAI DFA, 419/1/7, Report on visit to Germany, Austria and Hungary by Brian Brady, 11.
65NAI DFA, 419/1/7, Report on visit to Germany, Austria and Hungary by Brian Brady. The
US assessment of the manpower shortage was similar. See NAI DFA, 417/1/7, Excerpt from a
report of the American Military Government on the German Prisoners of War, returning from
Russian captivity, in Neue Zeitung, 8 August 1947.
12 Irish Studies in International Affairs
International Red Cross. The agreement with the Soviet zones stipulated that aid
was to be provided to all on the basis of need, regardless of political allegiance or
religious affiliation. The Irish relief was the first foreign aid to be distributed in the
Soviet zone.66 The philosophy underlying the official government gift was: ‘Needy
people in all four zones benefit equally without consideration either of their
political belief or religious faith’.67 Following the request of the Chief Rabbi of
Palestine, Isaac Herzog, Eamon de Valera, made arrangements for the provision
of kosher canned meat for displaced orthodox Jews.68
Many Irish NGOs contributed separately and generously to the relief of
Germany; for example, the Irish Red Cross, the Religious Society of Friends
(‘Quakers’), the CorkCologne Fund, the St Vincent de Paul Society, the Save the
German Children Society, the Knights of St Columbanus and the various
churches.69 These organisations undertook their own fundraising and collections.
Confessionalism played a potent role in the voluntary donations. A survey of Irish
newspaper reports indicates that emphasis was placed on assisting the Catholic
population of Germany in particular. Recalling Nazism’s persecution of the
Catholic Church was a notable item in Irish newspapers, particularly the Irish
Independent, with the implication that German Catholics were deserving
recipients of aid.70 In parallel, the small Irish Protestant congregations assisted
German Lutherans, drawing on their church-based networks. With the outbreak
of the Cold War, an additional factor impelling Irish charity towards Germany
was the need to alleviate the distress as a means to halt the spread of Communism
and save Europe for Christian civilisation.
The city of Cork adopted Cologne as the target for its humanitarian
donations during 1947 and 1948, and the local branch of the Save the German
Children Society was a driver in this relief effort. The German Caritas
organisation selected children*many of them orphans*from the heavily
bombed industrial region of the Ruhr, including Cologne, to be sent to Ireland
for recuperation and fostering with Irish families for up to three years as part of
‘Operation Shamrock’. Cologne was an area with a high Catholic population,
and Cardinal Josef Frings of Cologne wrote to thank the lord mayor and citizens
of Cork for sending clothes relief. This relief and spreading news of ‘Operation
Shamrock’ in the Ruhr region sparked a special connection between Cork and
Cologne. In September 1946, the commander of the military government in the
city, Lieutenant Colonel J.M. White, appealed to Cork’s lord mayor ‘to render
whatever assistance was possible to alleviate the terrible distress in Cologne’,
which he pointedly noted was 90% Catholic and had supported Nazism ‘far less’
than ‘most other parts of Germany’.71 ‘The threatening spectre of hunger and
misery is standing before us’, he reported.72 His pleading had added potency in
Cork by virtue of the fact that White’s grandfather held the office of lord mayor
66NAI DFA, 419/4 AA, Memorandum: ‘The alleviation of distress in Germany and Austria’,
10 April 1951, 2.
67NAI DFA, 419/1/7, Report on visit to Germany, Austria and Hungary by Brian Brady, 7
January 1947, 7.
68NAI DFA, 419/4 AA, Kosher meat, 18 February 1947.
69‘German gift to be unveiled on Saturday’, Irish Independent, 26 January 1956, 8; NAI DFA,
419/4/20, Secretary to Teclaff, July 1948.
70Editorial, ‘The pope on persecution’, Irish Independent, 4 June 1945, 2; ‘The Holy Father
indicts Nazis’, Irish Independent, 4 June 1945, 2.
71‘Cologne cardinal’s letter to Cork myor’, Irish Times, 14 August 1946, 3; ‘Irish officer appeals
for aid to Germans’, Irish Times, 3 September 1946, 3; ‘British colonel’s moving plea: plight of
Cologne’s population’, Irish Independent, 3 September 1946, 2.
72‘Irish officer appeals for aid to Germans’, Irish Times, 3 September 1946, 3; ‘British colonel’s
moving plea: plight of Cologne’s population’, Irish Independent, 3 September 1946, 2.
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of the city some 80 years previously.73 The CorkCologne link persisted until at
least 1949.74 War-shattered West Berlin became a focus for Irish aid even before
the commencement of the Berlin blockade (194849).75
A popular reflexive view underlay Irish relief after the ending of World War
Two: great wars were the product of great power politics, and such conflicts were
visited upon helpless humanity. Irish neutrality during the ‘Emergency’ was
partly sustained by such popular and fatalistic preconceptions. On viewing the
devastation visited upon Europe by war, it was considered morally and politically
mandatory that Ireland should demonstrate positive neutrality in peacetime by
contributing generously to the alleviation of the suffering. As a neutral, it felt
bound to provide humanitarian assistance to defeated belligerents too, in light of
the reluctance of the victors to act charitably.76 In June 1945 in the American
occupation zone the ‘normal’ ration was 860 calories for a German adult.77
Getting disaster relief into Germany and Austria, and distributing it, proved
challenging until Allied opinion recognised a calamity in the making and policy
was reversed. Much early Irish aid was delivered into the occupied zones via a
fellow neutral, Switzerland. The Caritas organisation also distributed the Irish
supplies throughout all four occupation zones in Germany according to ‘the
size of the population of the individual zones and dioceses, the percentage of
Catholic population, the degree of destruction and the number of refugees in
each zone’.78 Irish generosity was highlighted throughout the relief and feeding
centres in operations across Europe, including Germany.79 The Irish govern-
ment received heartfelt expressions of gratitude from relief agencies, including
the German Central Committee for the Distribution of Foreign Relief Supplies,
in addition to requests for additional supplies.80
The anti-fascist and anti-Nazi humanitarian, Dorothy MacArdle, published a
massive tome, Children of Europe, in 1949. This noteworthy piece of advocacy
detailed her travels throughout Europe, focusing on the plight of the continent’s
children after the war, but it also illuminated the general refugee and subsistence
crises in many countries. Although its goal was to document the situation of children
in destroyed liberated countries, it recognised the plight of German children too.81
MacArdle was an acquaintance of E´amon de Valera, having written her
gargantuan The Irish Republic in 1937 in close consultation with him. It is not
surprising that MacArdle’s campaigning Children of Europe was published by
Victor Gollancz’s London firm, which had also published The Irish Republic.
Gollancz, a committed left-wing and humanitarian activist, had publicised the
extermination of the Jews by the Nazi regime as early as 1942, but he did not
ascribe collective guilt to the German people. After the war he crusaded for
humanity to be shown in the treatment of the German population, critiquing the
73‘Irish officer appeals for aid to Germans’, Irish Times, 3 September 1946, 3; ‘British colonel’s
moving plea: plight of Cologne’s population’, Irish Independent, 3 September 1946, 2.
74‘Cologne thanks Cork’, Irish Times, 26 January 1949, 3.
75‘German cardinal thanks Ireland for food’, Irish Times, 14 February 1947, 3; ‘Bishop of
Berlin thanks president for food gifts’, Irish Times, 11 March 1948, 1; NAI PRES, P2665, Konrad
Cardinal von Preysing, Bishop of Berlin to President Sea´n T. Kelly, 9 February 1948.
76Auswa¨rtiges Amt-Politisches Archiv (AA-PA), Berlin, Bestand B31, Band 61; Editorial,
‘A German gift’, Irish Press, 23 January 1956, 4.
77AA-PA, Berlin, Bestand B31, Band 61; Editorial, ‘A German gift’, Irish Press, 23 January
1956, 4.
78Molohan, Germany and Ireland, 45.
79NAI DFA, 419/1/7, 11 February 1947.
80NAI DFA, 419/1/7.
81Dorothy MacArdle, Children of Europe: a study of the children of liberated countries; their
war-time experiences, their reactions, and their needs, with a note on Germany (London, 1949).
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harsh occupation policies of the Allies as a threat to the values of ‘western
civilisation’.82 To give effect to his beliefs he published his arguments and organised
the campaign ‘Save Europe Now’ to convince the British government to rescind its
ban on allowing Britons to post food parcels to Germany.83 This same ban
prevented Irish people from sending food parcels via Britain to Germany until
Gollancz’s ‘Save Europe Now’ succeeded in reversing British policy in September
1946.84 MacArdle’s perspective complemented Gollancz’s, and her Children of
Europe fitted into an emerging pattern of humanitarian transnationalism.
It is clear that Irish voluntary donations to Germany were particularly high
during successive Christmas seasons after 1945. In December 1947 the Irish
people donated nearly US$2-million worth of food and clothing to Germany.85
The elderly, ill, children, orphans, displaced persons and expellees were par-
ticular targets of the assistance. German commentators and recipients noted and
appreciated this generosity. Unsurprisingly, Irish charity drew many expressions
of gratitude from German individuals and bodies in the succeeding years.86
Conversely, some Allied, pro-Allied and liberated peoples initially formed
the unfavourable impression that Ireland was either foolishly or suspiciously
favourable towards defeated Germany. They could not comprehend how Ireland
could give assistance in equal measure on the basis of need to Germans and non-
Germans. Accusations of suspicious Irish Germanophilic behaviour were
quickly forthcoming. One example was the French publication Libres which,
in October 1945, published a disparaging and critical report. Libres claimed that
Ireland, together with Spain, could be considered the most favourable neutrals
towards Germany, although the paper approved generally of the Irish govern-
ment’s assistance programme of £3,000,000.87
One dimension of Irish assistance engendered particular controversy
both domestically and internationally: the motives of the Save the German
Children Society. This organisation, founded in October 1945 by Dr Kathleen
E. Murphy, had an avowed non-political purpose of saving ‘as many German
children as possible from death by starvation this winter. . .irrespective of class,
creed or politics’. It correctly contended that children were the most vulnerable
and were innocents. Its reputation became tarnished at its foundation, however,
when a newspaper reported the atavistic nationalist and anti-British comments
of two individuals attending its inaugural meeting. A Colonel J.J. O’Byrne
provocatively expressed his reasons for supporting the work of the society:
on the grounds of [my] pro-German feelings and [my] hatred of Britain. [We]
should do everything possible to end the Anglo-Saxon influence, not only here,
but elsewhere. If [we] took those German children, [we] should see that they are
brought up as Germans, and do not come under Anglo-Saxon influence.88
82Victor Gollancz, Our threatened values (London, 1946); Victor Gollancz, In darkest Germany
(London, 1947); Ruth Dudley Edwards, Victor Gollancz: a biography (London, 1987).
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1971).
84Victor Gollancz, Letter, ‘Parcels for Germany’, New Statesman and Nation, 14 September
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85Molohan, Germany and Ireland, 41.
86For example, see NAI DFA, 4/22/2; NAI DFA, 4/22/2 A; NAI DFA 419/1/7; NAI DFA 419/
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Although Dr Murphy responded to these sentiments at the meeting, claiming
the society was intended to be explicitly apolitical and that the focus was on
saving the vulnerable, the advertisement of such extreme opinion on the part of
some of its members at its inception damaged its public image. A police report
documented the anti-British and pro-Nazi tone of some of the comments made
at the meeting and revealed that some of the society’s members were associating
with former German internees or were associates of IRA men.89 Nonetheless, the
Irish Times expressed strong support for the efforts to save German children
from starvation, while decrying the overt political pronouncements of some
members of the society and the hatred of Britain voiced by some attendees at its
foundation. The paper’s editorial observed that Germans appeared to suffer
disproportionately because of an unwise Allied occupation policy, under which
the innocent as well as the guilty suffered.90 Regardless, the society’s ability to
fulfil its vision as a leading player in organising assistance for Germany was
gravely impaired. In light of the newspaper report and the dubious connections
of one or two of its founding members, the Irish authorities, the
Red Cross and other voluntary organisations adopted a guarded attitude to
the Save the German Children Society. The committee of the Irish Save the
Children Fund moved quickly to disassociate itself from the newly formed
society. It issued a statement ‘so as to prevent confusion’ to the effect that it was
‘recognised internationally for the relief of children, irrespective of race or creed,
and that it is regarded by the Red Cross as the natural channel through which
money for child relief should pass’.91 Henceforth the Save the German Children
Society was relegated to playing a supporting role to other, higher profile
organisations, notably the Red Cross.92 Its political pedigree or alleged dubious
associations meant it would remain suspect in the eyes of the authorities and
long established NGOs, although it did continue to operate into the early 1950s
and it did engage in considerable humanitarian work.
CONCLUSION
It is ironic that the Irish post-war relief effort remains largely overlooked and
underexplored. This is surprising, considering the Irish public’s widespread
participation in aid efforts and the Irish exchequer’s subvention of the relief
programme. It was a complex phenomenon that defies simple explanation, but
Ireland’s post-war aid to European countries was represented publicly to the
Irish people by Taoiseach E´amon de Valera as an appropriate policy, using
‘positive neutrality’ arguments: Ireland as a neutral and a Christian country had
an obligation to contribute to post-war reconstruction and the creation of an
improved international order.
In general, Irish policy-makers and citizens presumed that a neutral country
was obligated to provide essential food and humanitarian supplies to defeated
Germany and Austria, as well as to the nations that had been the victims of Nazi
aggression and rule. This view fitted in with the approach adopted by the Swiss
and Swedes in the humanitarian responses and served to assert a form of positive
neutrality. The neutral nations believed their contributions would compensate
partially for the lack of aid from the Allies to defeated nations, until the western
Allies reversed their punitive policies towards the German people in 1947 and
89Molohan, Germany and Ireland, 121 n. 37.
90Irish Times, 20 October, 1945, 3.
91‘Save the Children’, Irish Times, 19 October 1945, 2.
92For a more detailed assessment, see Molohan, Germany and Ireland, chapter three.
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1948. Of course, the demonstrative effect of these traditional neutrals galvanised
the Irish. Perhaps it was a case of ‘neutrality learning’?
The Irish post-war aid effort might even be termed a therapeutic neutrality
performative act that would differentiate Ireland from the belligerents and
retrospectively legitimise its neutrality on humanitarian grounds. The effort can
be viewed through the prism of the presumed moral superiority of Irish neutrality
in the face of Allied criticism that Ireland had defaulted on its responsibility as a
democracy to fight Nazism. But there is more to it than just that.
Another consideration animated the Irish governmental and public responses
to the humanitarian crisis that followed World War Two: 1945 marked the
centenary of the commencement of the ‘Great Famine’, which scarred Irish
collective memory. There was little by way of a national commemoration of the
Famine in 1945; Irish people were unsure how to commemorate it; the tragedy
was simply too enormous and recent to comfortably commemorate. But Irish
aid to war-torn Europe was a form of famine commemoration, and it appears
that many saw it in this light. It was also a celebration and thanksgiving for
deliverance from another catastrophe, this time an unprecedented global, wholly
man-made, catastrophe. In 1943 when government was considering how to
alleviate the Bengal famine it was mindful of the fact that India had sent
donations to Ireland nearly 100 years previously.93 Likewise, in preparation for
the June 1946 Da´il debate on the vote for a second year of the government aid
programme, briefs were prepared for de Valera enumerating the gifts that Ireland
received from Europe and America during the ‘Great Famine’ to assist in the
debate.94 The Irish memory of the ‘Great Famine’ was certainly an impetus for
the post-war aid effort.
In sum, many factors were entangled in the instigation and sustenance of the
Irish relief programme to Europe. Collective memory, nationalism, neutrality,
public diplomacy, a popular humanitarian impulse, thanksgiving for surviving
the war unscathed, and religion all became interwoven as Ireland contemplated
a devastated Europe. The entire project was larger than a simple government
programme, and it resonated with large components of the Irish population and
the voluntary sector. Identity, values and self-interest each played a role.
Was Ireland in Plato’s cave? Not in this respect at least. The Irish post-war aid
project was and remains unprecedented in scale and national involvement in the
history of Irish humanitarianism. It is paradoxical that it is not remembered.
That is another riddle. It would seem to have a lot to do with the ‘history wars’
over the rights and wrongs of the Irish ‘Emergency’ and the debate over Irish
post-war insularity. Yet, after their recovery, several European states and relief
organisations were effusive in their praise of the broadmindedness and liberality
of Irish charity after the war.
93NAI DT, S13373 A, Memorandum, ‘Assistance from India during Famine’, 10 November
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replying to the debate, 19 June 1946.
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